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Abstract
This article focuses on the impact of the UK’s decision to leave the EU on cooperation within the Council of the EU. It does
so by studying how cooperation between member states has changed from the period before the Brexit referendum to
the period after. In the emerging literature on Brexit, it has been highlighted that member states that have been close
partners to the UK will have to (and have started to) adjust their cooperation behaviour and form new alliances. While the
structure of cooperation in the Council is often understood to be stable over time, suggesting that cooperation is mainly
driven by structurally determined preferences that don’t easily change, a major event such as Brexit may force remaining
member states to restructure their cooperation behaviour. Accordingly, it is expected and tested whether less structurally
determined preferences have grown in importance for shaping patterns of cooperation in the immediate period following
the Brexit referendum. Using survey data based on interviews with member state negotiators to the Council, asking about
their network ties, compiled both in the period before and after Brexit referendum of 2016, it is shown that structurally
determined preferences are important in both periods and that more volatile ideologically-based preferences on the EU
integration dimension and GAL-TAN dimension have become important following the referendum. The article is informa-
tive both for those interested in the effects of Brexit on EU institutions, as well as those more generally interested in causes
of cooperation patterns in the Council.
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1. Introduction
The Council of the EU is a core institution and the his-
torical powerhouse of the EU legislature. It is the insti-
tution of the EU member state governments, who par-
ticipate in Council meetings to negotiate joint decisions
and legislation. The UK decided through a referendum in
2016 to leave the EU and started the process of seces-
sion in 2017. The UK has always been a central player
in the EU as one of its three big member states and
had a central position also in Council cooperation and
negotiation networks (e.g., Johansson, Naurin, & Lindahl,
2019; Naurin & Lindahl, 2008). Leaving the EU, and the
Council, is expected to leave remaining member states
with a need to adjust to this new cooperative landscape
(Huhe, Naurin, & Thomson, 2020). This is particularly
true to those that have traditionally had close relations
with the UK, a fact that many of them are also aware of
(Johansson et al., 2019). Cooperation and negotiations
are dynamic and build on exchange, and if some member
states make adjustments by seeking new partners, this is
likely to have general effects on the patterns and logic of
cooperation in the Council.
The question addressed in this article is: If and
how has cooperation in the Council changed from the
period before the Brexit referendum to the period after?
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Following this, it seeks to determine whether some expla-
nations have grown or diminished in importance in the
period following the Brexit referendum. Cooperation is
here understood as relational, and an active and delib-
erative choice. The article explores this question using
survey data whose respondents include representatives
of the 28 EU member states to a number of Council
preparatory bodies. The survey data hence builds on
self-reported cooperation. Two surveys are utilized, one
from 2015, i.e., the year before the Brexit referendum,
and one from 2018, i.e., the year after the process of
negotiating the withdrawal had begun. To explore if and
how cooperation changes, the explanatory power of
interest-based factors of both a structural nature and of a
more volatile ideological nature are tested. The network
analyses performed show that structural preferences are
important both before and after the Brexit referendum,
but that ideological proximity of governments on the EU
integration and GAL-TAN (Green–Alternative–Libertarian
and Traditional–Authoritarian–Nationalist) dimensions
becomes important only after the Brexit vote. Left–right
positioning of governments is not important on any side
of the Brexit referendum. These findings are not only
of relevance for understanding the impact of Brexit but
more generally for understanding cooperation in the
Council. It offers a deeper understanding of the struc-
ture of cooperation within the Council, and what the
commonly found geographical patterns of member state
cooperation may be based on.
The article starts with a review of what we already
know about the effects of Brexit on the Council, and
about cooperation patterns in the Council generally.
Following this, expectations are derived about what fac-
tors are likely to grow in importance when member
states adjust their cooperation behaviour in response to
the UK’s withdrawal. A presentation of the structure of
the data and statistical modelling follows and the empiri-
cal results are presented. The article ends with a conclud-
ing discussion on the implications of the findings.
2. Cooperation Behaviour in the Council
The Brexit referendum and withdrawal negotiations are
very recent events, and their effect on cooperation and
overall functioning of the EU and its institutions has only
been explored to a limited extent. Huhe, Naurin, and
Thomson (2017, 2020) tested the impact of the UK leav-
ing the EU for both the network relations of remaining
member states, but also for the content of policy out-
put. They did so by subtracting the UK from historical
data on cooperation and positions taken in legislative
negotiations in the Council, showing to what extent pol-
icy output would have been different had the UK not
taken part in the negotiations, as well as the degree to
which the standing of the historically strong allies to the
UK are affected when losing this strong partner. Their
findings on cooperation patterns corroborate what nego-
tiators themselves report regarding their need to adjust
their choices of cooperation partners in the Council, with
the close allies of the UK being particularly affected
(Johansson et al., 2019).
Following this, the question is how cooperation
changes and, in particular, in what direction the mem-
ber states adjust. That is, are cooperative relations fol-
lowing the same patterns and explanations as before, or
do other factors become more prominent in this adjust-
ment process? Also here, Huhe et al. (2020) offer some
answers. They show that new ties are formed by those
member states who lose standing in the network as a
consequence of Brexit, based on the positional proxim-
ity to other member states. The positional proximity is
determined based on a number of negotiated pieces of
legislation in the Council. In short, member states that
need to adjust cooperation post-Brexit form new ties
with other member states that they have historically held
similar policy positions to. Using a similar method, the
same authors have, more generally, shown that coop-
erative ties in the Council network are affected by pol-
icy position proximity (Huhe et al., 2018). While infor-
mative, these findings beg the more general question of
whether there are underlying explanations both for posi-
tion taking and network formation, and in particular, if
and how this has changed after the Brexit referendum.
Below, this will be further explored for the network rela-
tions of member states.
How cooperation is structured within EU institutions
is central to understanding how political decisions are
reached. Determining patterns of cooperation among
the EU member states within the Council has accord-
ingly been imperative in the study of its operation.
There is one major finding that is replicated in most
of these studies, regardless of the empirical data used:
the importance of member states’ geographical prox-
imity. This has historically meant that a north–south
pattern was observed (Elgström, Bjurulf, Johansson, &
Sannerstedt, 2001; Kaeding & Selck, 2005), which was
later complemented with an eastern group of member
states (Mattila, 2009; Naurin & Lindahl, 2008; Thomson,
2009). While providing an overall structure to coopera-
tion, geography is less enlightening when searching for
causal explanations.
The literature on cooperation in the Council has sug-
gested several explanatory factors for the ties between
EU member states of both a culturally-based and interest-
based nature (Elgström et al., 2001; Kaeding & Selck,
2005). Some point to geography as a cultural explana-
tion, but it is here rather believed to mask other variation
(cf. Beyers & Dierickx, 1998). The analysis will therefore
be limited to the interest-based explanations for coop-
eration, which are more clearly defined. Among these
are the positional proximity of member states, as dis-
cussed above. Such actor alignment has sometimes in
itself been used to indicate cooperation (Kaeding & Selck,
2005; Thomson, 2009), and studies of voting patterns
can also be understood as falling in this category with
an empirical focus on position taking (e.g., Hagemann,
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2008; Hagemann & Hoyland, 2008; Hosli, Mattila, &
Uriot, 2011; Mattila, 2008). The results of these stud-
ies are diverse. Some suggest that geographical patterns
indicate different attitudes to regulation and harmoniza-
tion on the one hand and financial transfers on the other
(Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Thomson, 2009). Others point to
the importance of ideological factors and in particular
the left–right dimension (Hagemann, 2008; Hagemann
& Hoyland, 2008). While both are plausible explanations
for cooperation, they are only tested on actor alignment,
which at best make them indirect indications of more
active cooperation.
The literature reviewed has hence shown that coop-
eration, or actor alignment, is stable over time when it
comes to geographical patterns, and has been affected
only to a limited extent by enlargement rounds (only
adding a geographical cluster). There are indications
about the relevance of more deeply rooted structural
preferences in member states in studies on actor align-
ment, which fit well with the findings on historical pol-
icy position proximity as an important explanation for
cooperative ties. The more volatile political preferences
that come from ideological factors, varying with govern-
ment composition, are critical contenders for explaining
cooperation. The empirical evidence for the relevance
of ideology that exists to date is inconclusive and has
been found only on position taking data based on vot-
ing. But if these are crucial factors also when studying
data on actual cooperative ties, and whether their impor-
tance has changed since the Brexit referendum, will be
discussed and analysed below.
3. Expected Changes in Cooperation Behavior after the
Brexit Referendum
It is well-established that cooperation in the Council
is stable over time and largely follows geographi-
cal patterns. This geographical structure has persisted
even when membership has significantly changed, such
as after the eastern enlargement. A null hypothesis
founded on this observation should hence be that the
same explanations for cooperation will be valid both
before and after the Brexit vote, and would also give
prominence for structurally determined preferences that
are resistant to change in both periods:
H0: The UK’s decision to leave the EU will not change
cooperation in the Council, and the effects of explana-
tory variables will be stable across the periods before
and after the referendum.
The main hypothesis to be tested against the null-
hypothesis is consequently that patterns of coopera-
tion between member states in the Council change
after the Brexit referendum. In order to test this, it
is necessary to establish what factors that structure
and explain the cooperative relations between mem-
ber states both before and after the Brexit vote. In gen-
eral, when searching for explanations for the strength
of relational ties—which cooperation is an example of—
it is natural to look for ways of measuring similarities
and differences between included actors. In theories of
social networks among individuals, explanations based
on such homophily mechanisms are regularly reported
to be strong predictors of network relations (e.g., Grund
& Densley, 2012). There are strong preference-based
motifs for choosing relations based on similarity, not
least in a decision-making setting such as the Council.
This characteristic of network relations hence also serves
as a baseline assumption here.
Knowing that cooperation patterns in the Council
have historically been stable, it is expected that similari-
ties between member states that are more structurally
determined should be important. Thomson (2009), as
well as Kaeding and Selck (2005), has shown that mem-
ber states that take similar positions in the EU Council
belong to different geographical clusters, and based on
this observation inferred that this might be caused by
shared attitudes to regulation and financial transfers.
They base this on a general understanding of the mem-
ber states belonging to the different geographical clus-
ters. I attempt here to take this suggestion one step
further, by arguing that member states have different,
historically rooted, preferences on the degree of state
intervention in the economy that are not rapidly chang-
ing. These preferences are here also believed to be cru-
cial determinants for the type of regulatory systems
that member states want in the EU, and should there-
fore also be important for their cooperative ties in the
EU, and the Council specifically. The argument is based
on an understanding of policy conflict that emanates
from the literature on Varieties of Capitalism (VoC; e.g.,
Hall & Soskice, 2001). In short, this literature separates
state systems on a spectrum from Coordinated or Social
Market Economies to Liberal Market Economies, captur-
ing different degrees of state intervention in the econ-
omy through indications such as taxation, social expen-
diture, and overall regulation. VoC has previously been
shown to be an important determinant for the structure
of member state conflict in the EU, both in treaty amend-
ing processes (Fioretos, 2001) and in the EU Court of
Justice (Larsson & Naurin, 2019). Its impact on how the
Council operates has not been tested.
It has been argued that the UK’s decision to leave
the EU forces the remaining member states, particu-
larly those who had previously had strong ties to the
UK, to seek new partners in the Council (Huhe et al.,
2020; Johansson et al., 2019). As the relevant relations
along the VoC dimension are believed to already have
been established before the Brexit vote, any new rela-
tions should be expected to be found along other dimen-
sions. That is, instead of moving further away on the
VoC dimension when seeking new partners, as these will
inevitably be decreasingly similar and previously deemed
less relevant, it is expected that the member states will
look elsewhere for these new relations. Also here, a
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reasonable expectation is that the member states will
follow the homophily logic outlined above and that new
cooperative relations will be established between mem-
ber states that have similar preferences. The main con-
tending preference-based dimension is ideology, which
is here expected to become increasingly important when
member states adjust to the new cooperative space in
the Council after the UK’s decision to leave. While pre-
vious research has found some, yet limited, evidence
of the importance of ideology for position-taking in the
Council (Hagemann, 2008; Hagemann & Hoyland, 2008),
it might hence be that the adjustment process triggered
by the Brexit vote forces the member states to seek
new relations on this dimension, at least in the short-
term. In short, structural preferences—here conceptual-
ized through VoC—are expected to be important in the
period both before and after the Brexit referendum, but
ideologically-based explanations will grow in importance
in the period after the referendum:
H1: The UK’s decision to leave the EU will change coop-
eration in the Council, and in particular the explana-
tory strength of ideology will grow in the period after
the referendum.
Which the relevant ideological dimensions are, and
when, for policy positioning in the EU is disputed. The
left–right dimension is a baseline dimension for mapping
party –political conflict (Hagemann & Hoyland, 2008),
but it has been complemented with an EU integration
dimension, also when analysing the Council (Mattila,
2004). In addition, when studying voters and political par-
ties, it is increasingly common to also include some cul-
turally oriented dimension, such as GAL-TAN (Hooghe,
Marks, & Wilson, 2002). The left–right dimension cap-
tures political actors’ socio-economic attitudes, the EU
integration dimension captures political actors’ general
view on furthering European integration, whereas the
GAL-TAN dimension captures political actors’ general atti-
tudes on more culturally-oriented issues and values, sep-
arated in a divide between libertarianism and tradition-
alism. The three dimensions are not completely distinct
but often shown to be correlated, either in a linear or
curve-linear form (e.g., Costello, Thomassen, & Rosema,
2012; Hooghe et al., 2002). All three dimensions will be
included in the empirical analyses below to evaluate H1.
4. Data and Statistical Modelling
The data used to test the hypotheses comes from
The Negotiations in the Council of the European Union
Dataset (Naurin, Johansson, & Lindahl, 2020). The
dataset builds on an interview survey with member state
representatives to a number of Council preparatory bod-
ies, which was conducted triennially from 2003 to 2018.
The survey questions posed have varied somewhat in the
different rounds, but one central question was posed in
all which asked about the respondent’s cooperation part-
ners in the Council. This question forms the basis for the
dependent variable, as discussed below, and straightfor-
wardly asks: Which member states do you most often co-
operate with in order to develop a common position?
To explore whether the Brexit referendum has had
an impact on cooperation in the Council, the two latest
rounds of the survey conducted in 2015 and 2018 were
used. This allows comparison of cooperation patterns and
associated explanations in the period before the Brexit
referendum in 2016 to the period after. The 2015 round
was conducted from October to December, so was con-
cluded around six months before the referendum, and
the 2018 round was conducted between April and July,
when negotiations on the exit terms had been going on
for around a year (the actual negotiations started only
after the UK’s general election in June 2017). When the
2018 round was conducted, the remaining member states
can be expected to have started to view Brexit as a reality,
and if Brexit changes cooperation in the Council, it should
be possible to observe it by this point in time. It is impor-
tant to note that there is, as yet, no survey conducted
after Brexit and that British representatives were included
in the 2018 survey round. More long-term effects will
therefore need to be the subject of future studies.
It is worth emphasizing that it is not possible to
establish any causal effect of the Brexit vote on coop-
eration using this data, but only to observe if there
are any changes in cooperation between the period
before the referendum and the period after. But, if
any changes in cooperation were observed, it would
be natural to attribute these to significant events dur-
ing the period between the two points of measurement.
There are of course other events during the period of
study (2015–2018) that might affect cooperation too, for
instance, the unfolding of the migration crisis in 2015,
which began during the first of the two survey rounds
under study. Both the migration crisis, with its political
repercussions, and the Brexit vote can, in turn, be seen
as part of the growing politicization of the EU. Some have
argued that this politicization can lead to a democratiza-
tion of the EU, building up the polity and making politi-
cal conflict increasingly party-based (cf. de Wilde, 2011;
de Wilde & Lord, 2016; Zürn, 2016). While it is not obvi-
ous that this leads to increased ideological conflict in
the EU, it is sometimes indicated that it could be a log-
ical consequence (e.g., Börzel & Risse, 2009; de Wilde,
2011; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Any shift towards more
ideologically-driven cooperation in the Council might
hence have been already underway in 2015. However,
even if the migration crisis and general politicization
trends might be moving the EU member states in a more
ideological direction, the subtraction of a member state
can be expected to act as a trigger forcing other mem-
ber states to actually start searching for new cooperation
partners. Existing studies on how the Council is affected
by the Brexit vote have also shown that remaining mem-
ber states are adjusting their cooperative relations (Huhe
et al., 2020; Johansson et al., 2019).
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In each survey round, all member state represen-
tatives to eleven selected preparatory bodies were
asked to participate. The targeted preparatory bod-
ies were selected to give a broad coverage of pol-
icy areas and levels of seniority in the Council. The
preparatory bodies covered in 2015 were: Coreper I,
Coreper II, Political and Security Committee, Special
Committee of Agriculture, Economic Policy Committee,
Politico-Military Group, Working Party on Tax Questions,
and Coordinating Committee in the area of policy
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Working
Party on Agricultural Questions, Working Party on
Competitiveness and Growth, and the Working Party on
the Environment. The same bodies were covered in 2018,
with the exception of the Working party on Agricultural
Questions, which was replaced with the Working Party
on Horizontal Agricultural Questions. The sample hence
covers both senior groups of general scope such as
Coreper I and II, and more technical working parties in
areas such as environment and taxes. Both the 2015 and
2018 survey round targeted 308 member state represen-
tatives (28 member states × 11 preparatory bodies), of
which 225 and 251 respondents participated in an inter-
view with response rates of 73% and 81%, respectively
(although they varied somewhat between preparatory
bodies and member states).
The dependent variable for the analyses is based on
the question of cooperation partners. The respondents
were asked to mention at least three member states, but
there is variation in how many they did, in fact, men-
tion. Based on the order that other member states were
mentioned, scores are assigned to the receiving mem-
ber state, starting with 10 points for a first mention,
9 points for a second mention, and so forth. To give each
respondent the same weight in the data, their scores
were then standardized to a share of scores, ranging from
0 to 1, meaning that if one respondent only mentions
one other member state and hence gives it 10 points,
that member state will receive a score of one, whereas
a 10 point score from a respondent that mentioned two
member states will only be worth 0.53 (and the 9 will
be worth 0.47). These scores were then aggregated for
each member state so that the value of each outgoing
tie in the resulting member state network is the share
of scores that respondents from that sending member
state gave to each of the receiving member states. Based
on these data on the strength of ties in each dyadic rela-
tion, a network of the member states can be mapped
and analysed. The analyses of the networks in this arti-
cle are done using the nwcommands package in Stata
(Grund, 2015). The networks from 2015 and 2018 are
mapped in Figure 1, where the size of the nodes is based
on the sum of aggregated cooperation scores received,
which hence indicates the member states’ strength in the
network. The aggregated cooperation scores (the sum of
incoming scores from other member states) are also dis-
played in Table 1, ranked by the 2018 values. It should
be noted that not all member states have ties to each
other, and that some ties are not reciprocal but unidirec-
tional. In the 2015 network, there are 87 reciprocated
ties and 141 unidirectional ties, and in 2018 there are 123
reciprocated ties and 140 unidirectional ties. However,
even when ties are reciprocated in the network, they can
still be unbalanced in value, meaning that the reciprocity
here is not based on equality. Given that the respon-
dents often mention only a few cooperation partners,
there will inevitably be a bias towards the most impor-
tant relations, and it is hence worth to note that it is the
strength of the network ties that is measured and that
less important (yet existing) ties may go undetected with
this method.
The independent variables measure, on the one
hand, the different types of VoC of member states,

























































Figure 1. Network of member state relations in the Council 2015 and 2018.
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Table 1. Member states’ aggregated cooperation scores in 2015 and 2018.
Member state Cooperation score 2015 Cooperation score 2018
Germany 2.88 3.00
France 3.23 2.86


























the member state governments. Starting with VoC, it
is here measured using three components to capture
critical variation in how member states have histori-
cally chosen to regulate their economies, as highlighted
by Höpner and Schäfer (2012). These are: (1) social
protection expenditure as a share of GDP, which cov-
ers expenditures on disability, sickness/healthcare, old
age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, housing
and social exclusion not covered elsewhere (Eurostat,
2020a); (2) total taxation as a share of GDP, which cov-
ers receipts of taxes and social contributions (Eurostat,
2020b); (3) collective bargaining coverage, which mea-
sures employees covered by valid collective (wage) bar-
gaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and
salary earners in employment with the right to bargain-
ing, expressed as a percentage, adjusted for the possibil-
ity that some sectors or occupations are excluded from
the right to bargain (Visser, 2019). For each component,
the data was gathered for 2015 and 2018. Data on col-
lective bargaining coverage were however not available
for 2018, so have then been imputed from the nearest
available year. It is also missing for some member states
in 2015 and so was then imputed based on the means
of the nearest available year before and after. Based
on these data, a principal component analysis of these
three variables (eigenvalue 2.67 and 2.63 respectively)
was used to obtain a unidimensional VoC-measure using
the predicted values of the first component. Member
states with low values are identified as Liberal Market
Economies whereas member states with high values are
identified as Social Market Economies.
To measure the member state governments’ posi-
tions on the three outlined ideological dimensions,
weighted averages of the positions of cabinet parties
at the time of the survey were used. The weights of
the parties in the cabinet were obtained from their seat
share in parliament. Information on cabinet composition
and parliamentary seats was gathered from the ParlGov
database (Döring & Manow, 2019). In cases where sev-
eral governments were in place during the period of the
survey, the government with the longest time in office
during the survey period was chosen. To measure the
ideological positions of the cabinet parties, the datasets
from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey of 2014 (Polk et al.,
2017) and 2019 (Bakker et al., 2020) were used. The data
from 2019 is missing some parties that were in govern-
ment in 2018. Data for these parties was then obtained
from the 2014 round instead. For a couple of parties,
there were no available data in any of the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey rounds, so they were omitted from the
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analysis. These parties are however small in size, and
their omission is therefore not expected to affect the
results. As outlined above, three dimensions of ideologi-
cal positioning are used to test whether ideology affects
cooperation in the Council in the periods before and after
the Brexit referendum. These are the left–right dimen-
sion, the EU integration dimension, and the GAL-TAN
dimension. The political parties’ positions on the eco-
nomic left–right are chosen here, as this is more distinct
than the general left–right positioning when testing for
other ideological indicators as well. The empirical anal-
yses were however run on the general left–right posi-
tioning as well, without altering the results. The variable
measuring parties’ economic left–right position ranges
from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right), the variable
measuring parties’ EU position ranges from 1 (strongly
opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour), and the variable mea-
suring the GAL-TAN position ranges from 0 (libertar-
ian/postmaterialist) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian).
When testing explanatory variables in network anal-
ysis, it is the dyadic relation between any two nodes in
the network that is analysed. In the networks analysed
here, each node represents a member state. In a net-
work with 28 nodes (member states), these dyadic rela-
tions amount to 378, with twice the number of direc-
tional ties (756). Since the ties in the network analysed
here can be both unidirectional and unbalanced, it is the
756 directional ties that are of interest. For the analy-
sis, this means that the network is transformed to a
dependent variable with these 756 directional ties as
observations, each measuring the strength of an out-
going tie in the network (e.g., the strength of the tie
from Sweden to Denmark). The same logic underlies the
construction of the independent variables. When, as in
this case, the independent variables do not have a net-
work character, but only hold a value for each member
state, the variables are, in a first step, used to create
what can be understood as an artificial network based on
the absolute distance between any two of the member
states’ values on the independent variable (e.g., the dis-
tance on VoC between Sweden and Denmark). This arti-
ficial network contains the same number of directional
ties as the cooperation network, but unlike the coop-
eration network, each relation is completely balanced.
Meaning that while the value of the outgoing cooper-
ation tie from Sweden to Denmark can differ from the
value of the outgoing cooperation tie from Denmark to
Sweden (they are unbalanced), the distance between
the same two member states on VoC will be identical
and hence balanced. This setup, however, makes it pos-
sible to test whether the strength of a cooperation tie
from one member state to another is affected by the
corresponding difference in value on the independent
variable for the two member states. The artificial net-
works created from the independent variables are hence
regressed on the actual cooperation network. To test the
significance of the correlation between independent vari-
ables and the cooperation network, a p-value is given
using a Quadratic Assignment Procedure. What this pro-
cedure does is that it creates a series of networks that
randomly redistribute the nodes of the existing network
(permutations) to test whether the observed correlation
between the independent variable and the network is
significantly different from the correlations generated by
the randomized network. These permutations are hence
used to test whether a correlation exists by chance or not
(cf. Grund & Densley, 2012).
5. Results
Before evaluating which, if any, of the independent vari-
ables explain cooperation patterns before and after the
Brexit referendum, it is worth noting the similarities and
differences of the networks plotted in Figure 1. One
directly visible change, also shown in Table 1, is the
(expected) decreasing position of the UK in the network.
While still on the upper half of the ranking of member
states when it comes to their total network capital, it
has a strikingly more limited strength in the network in
2018 compared to 2015. Also, following the expectation
about the stability of cooperation patterns in the Council,
there is a strong correlation between the two networks
(0.77). Despite there being a large similarity, there is no
complete overlap, suggesting that there is important vari-
ation between the two survey rounds which is worth
exploring. The strength of the correlation between the
networks of 2015 and 2018 is in parity with the cor-
relation between the networks in 2012 and 2015. This
proves the stability of the networks but is a bit surpris-
ing in light of the expectation that Brexit will be a major
event affecting cooperation in the Council (Huhe et al.,
2020; Johansson et al., 2019), and is an indication that
the Brexit vote has not had an exceptionally large effect—
yet. The point here is, however, not to evaluate changes
taking place between 2012 and 2015, and what might
explain them, but instead to note that there do seem
to have been changes in the network over the studied
period. How cooperation changed between the period
before the Brexit referendum and after is evaluated here
using the outlined independent variables.
The results from the network analyses based on OLS
estimation are displayed in Table 2. What is evaluated
in each model is the relation between the strength of a
network tie between two member states, and their dis-
tance on each of the independent variables. For each
of the independent variables, which measure the dis-
tance between two member states on that variable, a
negative effect is expected on the strength of the net-
work tie. That is, as the distance between two member
states increases, the strength of the cooperation tie is
expected to decrease, and vice versa. The ideological
variables are tested in separate models since they are
internally correlated.
The regression results show a significant effect of VoC
that is robust and substantial in all models. Based on the
beta coefficients of models 1 and 2 using the 2015 data,
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Table 2. Regression results.
2015 2018
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B (p-value) B (p-value) B (p-value) B (p-value) B (p-value) B (p-value)
VoC −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.009*** −0.010*** −0.010*** −0.010***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic left–right −0.002 −0.003
(0.340) (0.218)




Intercept 0.058 0.052 0.058 0.060 0.064 0.068
Dyads 378 378 378 378 378 378
Notes: Dependent variable: strength of cooperation tie. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
the predicted cooperation tie between the most dis-
tant member states on VoC in 2015 (Ireland and France)
decreases by 0.042, which corresponds to 8% of the
value of the strongest tie between two member states
in the network. The predicted cooperation tie based on
the 2018 data decreases by 0.055, corresponding to 13%
of the value of the strongest tie between two member
states in the network. The effect of VoC is hence stable,
and if anything, it is becoming more important follow-
ing the Brexit referendum. The importance of VoC also
explains why there is stability in cooperation patterns in
the Council, in line with what previous research has only
indirectly suggested (cf. Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Thomson,
2009). It also offers some clues as to why geography
structures cooperation, as VoC in part follows geograph-
ical patterns, with member states on the Liberal Market
Economies side of the spectrum being more prevalent
in eastern Europe and Social Market Economies in west-
ern Europe.
There is no effect of the ideological variables in the
2015 data, but in 2018 a significant effect emerges on
both the EU integration dimension and the GAL-TAN
dimension. That both these variables become signifi-
cant simultaneously is not entirely surprising as they
too are correlated. Governments that are more closely
positioned on the EU integration and GAL-TAN dimen-
sion in 2018 hence also have stronger network ties. For
the EU integration dimension, UK and Portugal are the
most distant member states, and the beta coefficient of
model 5 predicts a decrease in the value of their net-
work tie by 0.031, corresponding to 7% of the value of
the strongest tie between two member states in the net-
work. The equivalent figure on the GAL-TAN dimension
(where Malta and Hungary are at the extremes) is 0.043,
which is 10% of the value of the strongest tie between
two member states in the network.
The results offer an indication that cooperation
indeed might be changing in the period after the Brexit
referendum, and that ideologically driven cooperation
becomes more important. The data does not allow any
conclusive inferences to be made on whether it is indeed
the result of the Brexit referendum or other concurrent
events that actually explain the changing dynamic of
Council cooperation. But the Brexit referendum is the
key event taking place in-between the points of measure-
ment, and we know from previous studies that mem-
ber states are adjusting cooperation to this new politi-
cal landscape. In addition, the patterns found follow the
logic outlined above, that Brexit forces member states
to adjust their cooperation, and in this process they
might start to approach member states based on other
similarities than the ones that have previously struc-
tured cooperation.
It is striking that it is the EU integration and GAL-TAN
dimensions that grow in importance in the period after
the referendum, and it stands in contrast to the pre-
vious findings on ideological cleavages in the Council,
which have predominantly pointed to the importance of
the left–right dimension (Hagemann, 2008; Hagemann
& Hoyland, 2008). There is a general understanding that
European politics have been getting increasingly identity-
based over the last decades (e.g., Hooghe & Marks, 2009,
2018), and it might be that this has now also entered
into the traditionally less ideology-infused Council. At the
same time, it is worth highlighting that the size of the
effect of VoC also increased following the Brexit referen-
dum, indicating that member state representatives are
nourishing pre-existing cooperative ties as well.
6. Conclusion
This article has explored changes in member states’ coop-
erative relations in the Council of the EU comparing
the period before the Brexit referendum in 2016 with
the period after. This contributes both to the discussion
about the effect of Brexit on the EU and its institutions,
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and more generally to the literature on what shapes
cooperative relations between member states in the
Council. Cooperative relations in the Council have histor-
ically been stable at the aggregate level, and the UK has
held a central position in Council networks over time and
has ranked high when measuring member states’ net-
work capital (Johansson et al., 2019). This position has
significantly weakened in the period following the Brexit
referendum, indicating not only a decrease in the UK’s
standing but also that other member states have started
to adjust to the post-Brexit cooperative environment in
the Council. The question of how the member states
have adjusted has been in the focus of this article.
The results clearly show that there is a stable rela-
tionship between member states’ proximity on the VoC
scale and the strength of their cooperative ties. Member
states that have historically established similar types
of regulatory systems domestically are hence likely to
also find common ground in the Council, resulting in a
closer cooperative relation. It is plausible that this will
continue to be an important determinant for cooper-
ation in the long term, beyond the immediate Brexit
years. It hence provides further evidence of the impor-
tance of this dimension for member state preferences
and policy conflicts in the EU (Fioretos, 2001; Larsson
& Naurin, 2019). In line with the outlined expectation,
the Brexit referendum also seems to affect the structure
of cooperation, indicated by the emerging importance
of the member state governments’ ideological proxim-
ity in the period after the Brexit referendum. The EU
member states have hence realigned on new dimensions
after the UK’s withdrawal became a reality, as evident
by the significant effects of both the EU integration posi-
tions and the GAL-TAN positions of governments. Also, in
this respect, the findings offer new insight into the struc-
ture of cooperation in the Council. While some previous
studies have pointed to the importance of left–right divi-
sions for position taking (Hagemann, 2008; Hagemann &
Hoyland, 2008), this research clearly points to the revival
of the EU integration dimension (Mattila, 2004) and the
introduction of the GAL-TAN dimension in the Council.
The results presented here should not be taken as
conclusive evidence that the Brexit referendum is the
cause of the growing importance of these ideological
dimensions, but it has been demonstrated that these
are coincidental trends. The Brexit vote, for instance,
happened as the migration crisis and its political con-
sequences unfolded, both of these events can be inter-
preted as an expression of growing politicization of the
EU. The Brexit vote has, however, here been suggested
to be a trigger for member states to adjust and seek new
cooperative relations in the Council. This is also in line
with the findings about the emerging effect of the ide-
ological dimensions. At the same time, the stable, and
even growing effect of VoC for cooperation suggests that
politicization has not been the only driver of political con-
flict in this period. Member state relations in the Council
remain stable and continue to follow these structural
preferences. This is an important complement to the
image of an increasingly politicized and changing coop-
erative space within the EU. Some have suggested that
politicization may result in polycleavage, cutting across
issues and member states (Zeitlin, Nicoli, & Laffan, 2019).
In light of this, the results shown here might be a sign of
an emerging, more complex, conflict space within the EU.
Whether it is a persisting trend or only a temporary effect
will, however, need to be further explored.
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